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In both organizational and social arenas, people make decisions for themselves and for 
other people. But research in decision making has provided little input into how these 
decisions are psychologically different. In this paper, I propose that decisions—
depending on whether people are deciding for themselves or others—vary according 
to regulatory focus, such that, people who make decisions for themselves are in a 
prevention focus, whereas people who make decisions for others are in a promotion 
focus. Drawing on regulatory focus, in particular work on errors of omission and 
commission, I hypothesize that people who make decisions for others experience a 
reversal of the choice overload effect. In seven studies, including a field study and a 
mini meta-analysis, I found that people who make decisions for themselves are less 
satisfied after selecting among many compared to few options, yet, people who make 
decisions for others are more satisfied after selecting among many compared to few 
options. Implications and suggestions for other differences in self-other decision 
making are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
People are hired, even elected, to make decisions on behalf of others—
consultants, politicians, and board members are three examples. And the quality and 
success of their decisions depend on the amount and type of information that is 
considered during the decision process (Payne, 1976). We might think at first glance 
that people who make decisions on behalf of others are less enmeshed in decisions and 
therefore more objective in assimilating and construing information. Put differently, 
people who make decisions for others may suffer fewer cognitive biases. A lawyer, for 
example in a divorce proceeding, may see the opposition’s argument more clearly than 
a client; or a real estate agent may more accurately generate a selling price than an 
owner. It is possible, however, that the net effect of deciding for others is accompanied 
with greater, not fewer systematic biases, and that the two examples provided here 
represent exceptions to this rule.  
Indeed, a small but growing research stream has documented cognitive biases 
among decision makers who specifically choose on behalf of others, and reported that 
(1) judging harmful actions as worse than equally harmful inactions (cf., omission 
bias; Zikmund-Fisher, Sarr, Fagerlin, & Ubel, 2006), (2) favoring information that 
confirms preconceptions (cf., confirmation bias; Jonas, Shulz-Hardt, & Frey, 2005), 
(3) weighting decision attributes more prominently than others (cf., lexicographic 
weighting; Kray, 2000), and (4) biasing information in support of a developing 
preference (cf., predecisional distortion; Polman, 2010) are greater among decision 
makers who decide on others’ behalves in relation to their own behalves. Although it  
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is evident that decision making is different when people decide for others compared to 
when people decide for the self, it is not fully understood why these differences occur.  
The current research investigates whether self-other differences in decision 
making can be explained by construal level theory (i.e., psychological distance; 
Liberman & Trope, 2003; 2008). By drawing on recent research that has connected 
construal level theory with regulatory focus theory (Mogilner, Aaker, & Pennington, 
2008; Pennington & Roese, 2003), this dissertation seeks to understand how, why, and 
under which conditions differences in regulatory focus occur among decision 
makers—juxtaposed to a context in which decision makers choose among either many 
or few options. On account of the possibility that some of the decision heuristics and 
biases are enhanced, reduced, non-existent or even reversed when decisions are made 
on behalf of others, I explore how one particular phenomenon, choice overload (i.e., 
experiencing more satisfaction after choosing among few compared to many options; 
cf., Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), operates in decisions that are made on behalf of others. 
Specifically, this dissertation addresses two questions: Does a different regulatory 
focus trigger among decision makers who decide on others’ behalves compared to 
their own behalves? And does experiencing a different regulatory focus cause decision 
makers to be more, or less satisfied, after choosing among many options? 
Psychological Consequences of Self-Other Decision Making 
One area of research that has highlighted a critical difference between making 
decisions for the self and making decisions on behalf of others is construal level 
theory, which states that psychologically distant items (e.g., future plans, i.e., temporal 
distance; e.g., faraway places, i.e., spatial distance) are represented in more abstract 
and simple terms than items that are psychologically close (Liberman & Trope, 1998). 
For example, in thinking about a camping trip that is scheduled for next year, 
participants classify camping items (e.g., potato chips, hot dogs) into fewer categories  
9 
than participants who think about a camping trip that is scheduled for next weekend 
(Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002). That is, in thinking about the distant future, 
people evaluate items more abstractly and hence use fewer and broader categories to 
classify items. In another example, it has been shown that social distance (e.g., the 
difference between deciding for the self and somebody else) increases the tendency 
that people will construe others in abstract ways (Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008; 
Pronin & Ross, 2006; Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2008). In particular, 
research has shown that people perceive their future selves in more abstract terms than 
they perceive their present selves (Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003). Moreover, 
people ascribe concrete variables to their present selves’ behaviors, yet ascribe 
abstract variables to both their future selves’ and others’ behaviors (Pronin & Ross, 
2006).  
By applying social distance to decision making, Pronin, Olivola, and Kennedy 
(2008) found that the decisions that people make for their future selves mirror the 
decisions that people make on behalf of others. In their study, participants indicated 
how much of a disgusting liquid that they would drink in the present moment or in the 
next semester; and in a separate condition, participants decided how much another 
participant would drink. To wit, participants who decided for others indicated the 
same amount as participants who decided for their future selves, whereas participants 
who chose for their present selves indicated that they would drink a significantly 
smaller amount (Pronin et al., Study 1). In other words, the decisions that people make 
for their future selves resemble the decisions that people make for others (and together 
differ from the decisions that people make for their present selves). Based on this 
finding, we might conclude that there is a veritable social distance between choosing 
for the self and choosing for somebody else. In fact, along these lines, recent research  
10 
by Borovoi, Liberman, and Trope (2010) instructed participants to choose either for 
themselves or for others as a way to manipulate social distance. 
Recent research suggests that social distance can also cause shifts in regulatory 
focus, suggesting that construal level theory and regulatory focus theory are 
interrelated (Mogilner et al., 2008; Pennington & Roese, 2003). According to 
regulatory focus theory, there are two basic motivational orientations that individuals 
adopt in the process of making a decision: promotion focus and prevention focus 
(Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997). Individuals in a promotion focus are sensitive to 
the presence and absence of positive outcomes, whereas individuals in a prevention 
focus are sensitive to the presence and absence of negative outcomes. Pennington and 
Roese (2003) found that as psychological distance increases, so too do promotion 
related concerns. Specifically, people show more promotion focused concerns (e.g., 
getting a high score on a test) after thinking about a test that would take place in two 
weeks, in contrast to a test that would take place later that day (Pennington & Roese, 
Study 1). In a more recent study, Mogilner et al. (2008) also showed evidence for 
construal level shifts in promotion and prevention related concerns. In particular, they 
found that participants were willing to pay more for a distant future vacation if the 
information about the vacation was promotion focused rather than prevention focused; 
and vice versa, participants were willing to pay more for a last minute vacation if 
information about the vacation was prevention focused rather than promotion focused 
(Mogilner et al., Study 2).  
With this relation between regulatory focus and psychological distance in 
mind, we might expect that when people make decisions for themselves (i.e., personal 
decision makers), social distance is set to zero and a prevention focus is triggered, 
whereas when people make decisions for others (i.e., proxy decision makers), social 
distance is greater than zero and a promotion focus is triggered. This reasoning is in  
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fact consistent with existing research. For example, Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp, and 
Allgaier (2003) found in a study on risk taking in relationships, that individuals 
encourage their friends to take risks that they themselves would not take, such as 
going out on a blind date. Of import, proxy decision makers gave more positive 
reasons compared to personal decision makers, and vice versa, personal decision 
makers gave more negative reasons compared to proxy decision makers. In another 
example, Jonas et al. (2005) found that proxy decision makers pursue more positive 
(i.e., supportive) information than personal decision makers. Together, these findings 
appear to be consistent with the behaviors one would expect from individuals who are 
in a particular regulatory focus. Thus, by incorporating regulatory focus with self-
other decision making, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: Proxy decision makers will be more promotion focused than 
personal decision makers. 
Hypothesis 2:  Personal decision makers will be more prevention focused than 
proxy decision makers. 
If decisions for others trigger a shift in regulator focus, then there may be 
considerable implications for a wide range of psychological processes. For example, 
relative to a prevention focus, a promotion focus has been found to increase creativity, 
self-control, and success in negotiations (Dholakia, Gopinath, Bagozzi, & Nataraajan, 
2006; Friedman & Förster, 2001; Galinsky, Leonardelli, Okhuysen, & Mussweiler, 
2005). Likewise, relative to a promotion focus, a prevention focus has been found to 
increase local processing, independent self-construals, and vigilance (Förster & 
Higgins, 2005; Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000). 
Particularly relevant to research on decision making is that a shift in regulatory focus 
makes decision makers more concerned with committing errors of omission in a 
promotion focus, and errors of commission in a prevention focus (Crowe & Higgins,  
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1997). And extending this to self-other decision making might explain the mixed 
findings concerning the varying levels of satisfaction that decision makers experience 
after choosing among many options. 
That is, according to regulatory focus, individuals’ level of motivation varies to 
the degree that individuals orient away from the presence of a negative outcome (error 
of commission), or alternatively, away from the absence of a positive outcome (error 
of omission). Furthermore, individuals’ level of motivation varies according to the fit 
between regulatory focus and a concern to minimize errors of omission and 
commission (Higgins, 2000). In the parlance of making a choice among options in an 
array, an error of commission is an unsatisfying yet present option, and an error of 
omission is a satisfying yet absent option. Consistent with regulatory focus, promotion 
focused individuals are concerned with securing satisfying options (i.e., avoiding 
errors of omission), whereas prevention focused individuals are concerned with 
avoiding unsatisfying options (i.e., avoiding errors of commission). 
In the context of choice, fewer options imply more omissions (and errors 
thereof), and likewise, more options imply more commissions (and errors thereof). 
Thus, among individuals in a promotion focus who are sensitive to committing errors 
of omission, a limited array should indicate that satisfying options are absent, whereas 
among individuals in a prevention focus who are sensitive to committing errors of 
commission, an extensive array should indicate that unsatisfying options are present. 
In this vein, a promotion focused individual will feel more satisfied after choosing 
from an extensive array because an extensive array precludes errors of omission (i.e., 
“With so many items available, the best items must also be available”). In contrast, a 
prevention focused individual will feel less satisfied after choosing from an extensive 
array because an extensive array produces errors of commission (i.e., “With so many 
items available, the worse items must also be available”). Said differently, the  
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difference in satisfaction between an extensive and a limited array depends on 
individuals’ orientation toward outcomes that are positive (i.e., “best items”) or away 
from outcomes that are negative (i.e., “worse items”)—a motivation that stems 
directly from individuals’ regulatory focus; in particular, individuals’ motivation for 
avoiding errors of omission and commission. In sum, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: Personal decision makers will experience more satisfaction after 
choosing among few compared to many options. 
Hypothesis 4:  Proxy decision makers will experience the reverse (i.e., more 
satisfaction after choosing among many compared to few options). 
To be sure, these hypotheses dovetail with a recent meta-analysis carried out 
on the relation between satisfaction and the number of options that decision makers 
choose among (Scheibehenne, Greifeneder, and Todd, in press). Specifically, 
Scheibehenne et al. examined the mixed findings surrounding decision makers’ 
satisfaction after choosing among either many or few options. On one hand, choosing 
among many options is considered a fundamental axiom in economics to enhance 
well-being, and in fact, has been shown to increase positive outcomes such as 
purchase behavior, consumption, and satisfaction (Anderson, Taylor, & Holloway, 
1966; Khan & Wansink, 2004; Koelemeijer & Oppewal, 1999). Indeed, having many 
options reduces the cost of searching for more options, makes it easier to get a sense of 
the overall quality among options, and increases decision makers’ freedom of choice 
(Eaton & Lipsey, 1979; Hutchinson, 2005; Reibstein, Youngblood, & Fromkin, 1975). 
On the other hand however, some research in psychology has found that choosing 
among many options leads to negative affective responses such as regret, pessimism, 
demotivation, and ultimately choice withdrawal (e.g., Iyengar & Jiang, 2004; Iyengar 
& Lepper, 2000; Iyengar, Wells, & Schwartz, 2006; Schwartz, 2004). In their review 
of this research, Scheibehenne et al. found that the net effect (i.e., the strength) of  
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choice overload is virtually zero—that is, the average effect size reported in papers 
supporting choice overload is nearly identical to the average effect size in papers 
finding no support for, or alternatively the reverse of, choice overload. As the authors 
note, in order to explain the effect of choice overload, it is essential to search for 
moderators. 
To this end, I build off and extend previous investigations of choice overload 
as well as answer Scheibehenne et al.’s call by investigating whether a hitherto 
unexplored moderator, self-other decision making, influences choice overload. 
Although much research has investigated choice overload, the research has focused on 
only one particular type of decision—a decision made for the self—and has not yet 
explored how the availability of choice affects decisions that people make for others. 
This is a critical distinction because in the real world, important decisions are often 
made on behalf of others (Yates, 1990), moreover, these decisions occur in an 
incredible range of contexts: CEOs make decisions on behalf of employees; generals 
on behalf of their troops; teachers on behalf of their students; parents on behalf of their 
children; members of corporate boards on behalf of shareholders; lawyers and 
financial planners on behalf of their clients; doctors on behalf of patients; and one 
spouse on behalf of the other. There may, however, be conditions in which the effect 
of self-other decision making on choice overload is less than straightforward, such as 
in the case when decision makers are accountable for their decisions. 
Accountability 
Accountability is defined as ‘‘being answerable to audiences for performing up 
to certain prescribed standards, thereby fulfilling obligations, duties, expectations, and 
other charges’’ (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994, p. 634). 
Decisions for the self are typically private, whereas decisions for others are, by virtue, 
public; a distinction between private and public decision making is important for three  
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reasons: First, compared to decisions for the self, decisions for others may foster 
different emotions such as embarrassment or pride. (Larrick, 1993; Simonson, 1989; 
Tetlock, 1985). Second, provided decision makers are aware that they will be forced to 
justify a decision to others, the decision itself may be qualitatively different than if 
decision makers are not aware that they will be forced to justify it (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999); and finally, third, decisions for others will vary according to whether the 
preferences for whom a decision is made are known or not (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). 
When others’ preferences are known, decisions made on behalf of others will shift in 
line with those preferences, however, when others’ preferences are not known, decisions 
tend to be characterized by high integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1985); that is to say, 
when others’ preferences are not known, decision makers tend to think more deeply of 
their decisions than if others’ preferences are known. 
To the extent that decision makers are held accountable for their decisions, it is 
reasonable to assume that self-other differences in decision making with respect to 
regulatory focus would disappear. Because of accountability, decision makers may 
receive blame from individuals who are affected by their decisions (Singer & Endreny, 
1993) or experience feelings of guilt resulting of poor decisions (Stone, Yates, & 
Caruthers, 2002). As an example, Casarett and Ross (1997) found that doctors 
sometimes make cautious decisions for their patients that are not consistent with 
patients’ predilections, for fear of feeling guilty after making decisions that are 
consistent with patients’ preferences. In another example, participants who were asked 
to represent and make decisions for constituents in a resource distribution game 
experienced more regret and behaved more carefully than participants who made 
decisions for themselves (Hibbing & Alford, 2005). Taken together, these findings 
suggest that when people are held accountable for the decisions that they make for  
16 
others, attention is drawn to a presence of negative information (e.g., fear, guilt, regret, 
caution; see also Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Put differently, I hypothesize: 
 Hypothesis 5: A prevention focus will activate among proxy decision makers 
who feel accountable for their decisions. 
  In line with the logic in support of Hypothesis 4 that states that a prevention 
focus is related with experiencing choice overload, it follows that:  
Hypothesis 6: Choice overload will be experienced among proxy decision 
makers who feel accountable for their decisions.  
In sum, virtually no work has investigated whether people attend to qualitatively 
different information according to whether they are deciding for themselves or for 
others. Beisswanger et al. (2003) and Jonas et al. (2005) found that proxy decision 
makers occupied themselves more with positive information than personal decision 
makers. I extend their findings by providing a theory that explains why decisions for 
others elicit attention to positive information, but also, why decisions for the self elicit 
attention to negative information. I predict that decisions for others and decisions for the 
self differ according to decisions makers’ regulatory focus, and that a promotion focus is 
activated among proxy decision makers, whereas a prevention focus is activated among 
personal decision makers. This means personal decision makers may experience choice 
overload, because they are motivated to avoid errors of commission which naturally 
evidence more in extensive arrays, whereas proxy decision makers may experience a 
reversal of choice overload, because they are motivated to avoid errors of omission 
which naturally evidence more in limited arrays.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
OVERVIEW OF STUDIES 
 
The current research examines self-other decision making in a choice overload 
context, and investigates whether post-choice satisfaction and regulatory focus vary 
according to decision maker role (personal versus proxy) and how many choices are 
available (many versus few). In Study 1, participants chose paint swatches with the 
prediction that among participants who choose for somebody else, a reversal of the 
choice overload effect would be observed. Participants who choose paint swatches for 
others would experience greater satisfaction after choosing among many compared to 
few swatches, whereas participants who choose for themselves would evidence the 
choice overload effect and experience greater satisfaction after choosing among few 
compared to many swatches. Study 2 investigates and extends the findings from Study 
1 to a field setting. Customers from two different wine stores varying in size (small 
versus large) were asked whether they were buying wine for themselves or for others, 
and how satisfied they were with their purchases. In line with Study 1, I predicted that 
customers who buy wine for others would experience more satisfaction given they 
purchase from the large store (i.e., select among many options), whereas customers 
who buy wine for themselves would experience more satisfaction given they purchase 
from the small store (i.e., select among few options).  
Studies 3a and 3b were carried out with two goals in mind. The first goal was 
to replicate the results of Studies 1 and 2 using different manipulations and measures. 
The second goal was to test whether regulatory focus causally mediates the relation 
between self-other decision making and choice overload. Spencer, Zanna, and Fong 
(2005) proposed that strong inferences of a causal chain can be made if the  
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independent variable and mediating variable are both manipulated. To that end, self-
other decision making and regulatory focus were independently manipulated. 
Specifically, the effect of self-other decision making on regulatory focus was 
investigated in Study 3a—participants responded to scenarios concerning decisions 
that they would make for themselves or for others (for a list of the scenarios, see 
Beisswanger et al., 2003); following that, participants responded to items comprising 
the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire (RFQ; Higgins et al., 2001), a validated scale that 
measures participants’ promotion and prevention focus. In complement to Study 3a, 
the effect of regulatory focus on choice overload was investigated in Study 3b—
participants’ regulatory focus was manipulated by instructing participants to write 
about their hopes and aspirations, or alternatively, their duties and obligations. The 
former induces a promotion focus, whereas the latter induced a prevention focus 
(Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Then, participants chose among different 
flavors of ice cream, with some participants choosing among few flavors, and others 
choosing among many flavors. I predicted in Study 3a that proxy and personal 
decision makers evidence a promotion focus and prevention focus respectively, and 
that in Study 3b, a prevention focus would lead people to experience greater 
satisfaction after selecting among few ice cream flavors, whereas a promotion focus 
would lead people to experience greater satisfaction after selecting among many ice 
cream flavors. 
In the next two studies, two moderators relevant to self-other decision making 
were tested. First, in Study 4, social distance was manipulated. I suggested earlier that 
personal and proxy decision makers experience a different regulatory focus because of 
construal level theory. I thus manipulated social distance to see whether proxy 
decision makers who include others into the concept of the self (i.e., experience low 
social distance between self and other; interdependent self-construal; Triandis, 2001)  
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evidence a prevention focus, and by that account, experience choice overload. This 
notion is consistent with research showing that an interdependent self-construal is 
related to more emphasis on prevention focused information (Lee et al., 2000). 
Specifically, participants in Study 4 were asked to carry out a circle-the-pronoun task 
that has been used in other research to elicit an interdependent or independent self-
construal (e.g., Gardner, Gabriel, & Lee, 1999; Kuhnen & Oyserman, 2002). Next, 
participants were asked to select a paint swatch among either many or few options as 
in Study 1; then finally, participants generated responses to the extent that they 
endorsed certain proverbs—an exercise that has been validated to measure regulatory 
focus (van Stekelenburg, 2006; e.g., Faddegon, Scheepers, & Ellemers, 2008).  
Study 5 was carried out to shed light on the effects of accountability in self-
other decision making. As with self-construal, accountability is related to more 
emphasis on prevention focused information. Tetlock (1985) suggested that when 
people are held accountable they simultaneously behave vigilantly; and vigilance is a 
sign of a prevention focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Specifically, in this study, 
students in a class selected courses for the following semester for either themselves or 
somebody else, and from either a small or large array of courses. To manipulate 
accountability, half of the students were informed that they would have to justify their 
class choices to the professor of the class, the other half of students were instructed to 
generate reasons anonymously without having to justify their class choices to the 
professor. Students also filled out the same instrument used in Study 4 measuring their 
endorsement of proverbs, and hence regulatory focus. I predicted that under conditions 
of accountability, a prevention focus would be activated, and therefore, both personal 
and proxy decision makers would experience choice overload. 
Finally, in the last study I conducted a mini meta-analysis of Studies 1, 2, 4, 
and 5 in order to assess the reliability of the relative strength of the reverse choice  
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overload effect among decisions that people make for others. Thus across seven 
studies, including one field study and one mini meta-analysis, participants faced four 
different kinds of choices, furthermore, these choices ranged from completely 
hypothetical (paint swatches; ice cream flavors) to ostensibly real (courses) to 
absolutely real (wine). In short, I predict that choices for others produce a reversal of 
the choice overload effect (Study 1 and 2)—on account of the different regulatory 
focus that is elicited by people who make decisions for themselves and for others 
(Study 3a and 3b)—and that social distance and accountability moderate this 
relationship (Study 4 and 5).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
STUDY 1 
 
  In this first study, participants were instructed to choose a paint color from 
either a limited or an extensive array of paint swatches. Half of the participants made 
selections for themselves, the other half made selections for somebody else. The main 
dependent measure was participants’ post-choice satisfaction. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. One hundred and sixty-eight undergraduates 
agreed to participate in exchange for extra credit. Provided with paint swatches, 
participants were asked to select a color that they would like to use in either their 
bedroom or in somebody else’s bedroom. The number of colors that participants could 
choose from varied, such that participants could choose among either 8 colors or 35 
colors. After selecting a paint color, participants answered two likert questions from 1 
(not at all) to 9 (extremely) that measure satisfaction (“How satisfied are you with the 
paint color you picked?” and “How much do you regret choosing the color you 
selected?”). After reverse scoring the second question, these items were combined into 
one scale (α = .84). 
Results and Discussion 
I hypothesized an interaction between choice array and for whom an individual 
is choosing with respect to how satisfied individuals are with their final choices. In 
order to test this, I conducted a 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 
(choice array: few versus many) ANOVA on participants’ satisfaction, which revealed 
the predicted significant interaction, F(1, 121) = 9.63, p < .01. Participants who chose 
for themselves reported more satisfaction after they were presented with few options  
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(M = 6.65) compared to many options (M = 5.84), t(63) = 2.22, p < .05; this is 
consistent with Iyengar’s research on the choice overload effect (Iyengar & Lepper, 
2000). However, as I predicted, the reverse occurred among participants who chose for 
others. Faced with this decision, participants reported more satisfaction after they 
chose among many options (M = 7.10) compared to few options (M = 6.28), t(58) = 
2.17, p < .05. No main effects were significant, however, a marginal effect of decision 
maker role showed that participants who chose for others experienced slightly more 
satisfaction (M = 6.69) compared to participants who chose for themselves (M = 6.25), 
F(1, 121) = 2.88, p = .09. 
These findings suggest that choosing for others produces a reversal of the 
choice overload effect. Individuals who chose for others were more satisfied after 
choosing among many compared to few options. Conversely, individuals who chose 
for themselves were more satisfied after choosing among few compared to many 
options. Research on regulatory focus can potentially explain these findings. The role 
of regulatory focus was examined further in Studies 3-5, but before reporting on those 
studies, Study 2 was carried out to determine if the results from Study 1 would apply 
to a field setting.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
STUDY 2 
 
This study was carried out to replicate the findings from Study 1, as well as 
examine if the findings extend beyond the laboratory to a field setting. In this study, 
customers from both a small and large wine store were approached and asked about 
their satisfaction with their wine purchases, as well as for whom they were purchasing 
(self versus other). A study such as this one is pertinent to the present work because 
the persons for whom choices were made were real and willfully conducted. In 
contrast, the choices and decision maker roles in Study 1 might be considered 
ambiguous, being that the choices were hypothetical and the decision maker roles 
were potentially artificial—Study 2 overcomes this limitation by testing the 
hypotheses in a scenario with real choices for people of customers’ preordained 
choosing. 
Method 
Sample and Procedure. Sixty-eight customers from two wine stores in a small 
city (population = 29,000) in upstate New York were approached and asked if they 
would be willing to answer two short questions about their wine purchases; sixty of 
those customers agreed, signifying a response rate of 88%. The wine stores differed 
according to size and stock. The small store—representing a decision with few 
choices—is about 400 square feet; the large store—representing a decision with many 
choices—is roughly ten times the size of the small store. Interviews at each store were 
conducted one week apart on a Saturday from 4-6PM. Exactly 30 data points were 
collected at each store; although there were no differences between stores with respect 
to the number of male or female customers, or for whom customers were buying, there  
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was an overall difference for whom customers were buying such that customers from 
both stores were more likely to purchase wine for themselves (.70) than for others 
(.30), χ
2(1, N = 60) = 9.60, p < .01 
Measures. Upon agreeing to participate, customers were asked two questions 
which were counterbalanced. One question was about the person(s) for whom the wine 
was for, “Did you buy the wine for yourself or for somebody else?”. The other 
question was about customers’ satisfaction, “On a scale from one to eleven—from not 
satisfied to extremely satisfied—how would you rate your satisfaction with your 
purchase?”. The experimenter recorded customers’ answers as well as their gender and 
then debriefed each customer by explaining the hypotheses of the study.  
Results and Discussion 
  Preliminary analyses showed that order of questions and gender of customer 
did not predict customers’ satisfaction or for whom they were buying wine, thus the 
data were collapsed across both of these factors. 
In keeping with Study 1, I predicted an interaction between the number of 
available wine choices, and for whom customers were purchasing with respect to the 
satisfaction customers experience. To test this, I conducted a 2 (decision maker role: 
personal versus proxy) X 2 (store size: small versus large) ANOVA on customers’ 
satisfaction, which revealed the predicted significant interaction, F(1, 56) = 12.27, p < 
.01. Customers who purchased wine for themselves experienced more satisfaction 
after shopping at the small wine store (M = 9.10) compared to the large wine store (M 
= 8.38), t(40) = 2.53, p < .05; once again this is consistent with the choice overload 
effect. However, a reverse choice overload effect occurred among customers who 
purchased wine for others. Faced with this decision, customers experienced more 
satisfaction after shopping at the large wine store (M = 9.44) compared to the small 
wine store (M = 8.00), t(16) = 2.30, p < .05. No main effects were significant.  
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These findings both replicate and extend Study 1. Post-choice satisfaction 
varied as a function of the number of choices in an array, and the person for whom one 
is choosing. Of import, this study took place outside of the laboratory, thus its major 
strength lies in replicating the effect in a realistic setting. However, because of this 
setting, there are some limitations to bear in mind. For example, it is possible that 
personal and proxy decision makers varied on other, unmeasured dimensions such as 
how much time and money they spent in each store. Moreover, personal and proxy 
decision makers’ preferences (e.g., liking red wine but buying for someone else who 
likes white wine) or goals (e.g., buying an expensive or unique wine for someone else 
with the aim of impressing him or her) may have also varied. Finally, there may have 
been differences in the degree that personal and proxy decisions makers seek or use 
advice from others (e.g., store employees). Owing to the limitations inherent in field 
studies—it is not possible to research all variables that might be of interest because of 
both logistical and ethical constraints—potential differences such as these could not be 
measured, yet they may play a role in both self-other decision making and choice 
overload. That said, using both laboratory and field methods undoubtedly provides 
more convincing evidence that greater satisfaction can result after choosing among 
extensive choices, so long as individuals choose for others. I suggested that this is 
because a different regulatory focus is activated among personal and proxy decision 
makers. Studies 3a and 3b examine this possibility by showing whether regulatory 
focus mediates the relation between self-other decision making and choice overload.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 
STUDIES 3A AND 3B 
 
In this pair of studies, mediation between self-other decision making and 
choice overload was tested causally by manipulating both the independent variable 
(self-other decision making) and mediator (regulatory focus). In Study 3a, participants 
were asked to respond to scenarios concerning decisions they would make for 
themselves; alternatively, participants were asked to respond to scenarios concerning 
decisions they would make for others. Next, participants responded to items from the 
RFQ—a validated scale that measures promotion and prevention focus (cf., Higgins et 
al., 2001). In Study 3b, participants were induced with either a promotion or 
prevention focus and then asked to select among either many or few ice cream flavors. 
Taken together, the results of Studies 3a and 3b could indicate that self-other decision 
making influences people’s regulatory focus, and that regulatory focus influences 
choice overload. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Two hundred seven undergraduates agreed to 
participate in exchange for extra credit. In Study 3a (N = 117), the effect of self-other 
decision making on regulatory focus was investigated, whereas in Study 3b (N = 90), 
the effect of regulatory focus on choice overload was investigated. These studies 
would provide a causal link between self-other decision making, regulatory focus, and 
choice overload. 
In Study 3a, participants were given 11 scenarios from Beisswanger et al. 
(2003), each describing a decision about a real-life issue. Specifically, participants 
made decisions for a same-sex friend, or for the self. After participants responded to  
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the scenarios, they filled out the RFQ (cf., Higgins et al., 2001), an 11-item 
questionnaire that measures promotion focus and prevention focus.  
In Study 3b, the mediator was manipulated. Specifically, regulatory focus was 
manipulated by asking participants to write a brief essay about their hopes and 
aspirations, or alternatively, their duties and obligations (cf., Higgins et al., 1994). In 
order to induce a promotion focus, participants were asked to think about how their 
current hopes and aspirations are different now from what they were when they were 
growing up, as well as what accomplishments they would ideally like to meet at this 
point in their life. In contrast, to induce a prevention focus, participants were asked to 
think about how their current duties and obligations are different now from what they 
were when they were growing up, as well as what responsibilities they think they 
ought to meet at this point in their life. After writing their essays, participants were 
presented with pictures of different flavors of ice cream, and asked to select a flavor 
that they would choose for themselves or for a friend. The number of flavors that 
participants could choose from varied, such that participants could choose among 
either 8 flavors or 35 flavors. After selecting an ice cream flavor, participants 
answered the same questions measuring satisfaction from Study 1 (α = .70), in 
addition to three items measuring overload. Specifically, participants indicated to what 
extent they felt overwhelmed; confused in the decision process; and how difficult it 
was for them to decide which ice cream to choose (cf., Diehl & Poynor, 2007). The 
overload items, which were anchored from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely), 
demonstrated high reliability (α = .81). 
Results and Discussion 
The primary dependent variables for Studies 3a and 3b are the reported levels 
of promotion and prevention among proxy and personal decision makers (Study 3a), 
and the levels of satisfaction and overload among promotion and prevention focused  
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participants (Study 3b). As predicted, proxy decision makers reported more promotion 
focus (M = 22.59) than personal decision makers (M = 21.19), t(115) = 2.36, p < .05. 
Moreover, personal decision makers reported more prevention focus (M = 17.32) than 
proxy decision makers (M = 15.98), t(115) = 1.98, p < .05. Thus, the results of Study 
3a support the link between self-other decision making and regulatory focus—proxy 
decision making is related to promotion focus, whereas personal decision making is 
related to prevention focus. Would, however, regulatory focus predict choice 
overload?  
Study 3b investigated this possibility. In particular, I conducted two separate 2 
(regulatory focus: prevention versus promotion) X 2 (choice array: few versus many) 
ANOVAs; one on participants’ satisfaction and another on participants’ overload. 
Both of which revealed the predicted significant interactions, F(1, 86) = 24.42, p < 
.001 for satisfaction; F(1, 86) = 8.51, p < .01 for overload. In addition, a main effect 
of choice array evidenced for overload, F(1, 86) = 8.82, p < .01. Not surprisingly, 
participants experienced greater overload after choosing among many options (M = 
3.83) compared to choosing among few options (M = 2.94). However, with respect to 
the interactions, prevention focused participants experienced more satisfaction and 
less overload after selecting among few ice cream flavors (Msatisfaction = 8.44; Moverload 
= 2.55) than among many ice cream flavors (Msatisfaction = 7.53; Moverload = 4.33), t(40) 
= 3.07, p < .01 for satisfaction; t(40) = 4.10, p < .001 for overload. And as expected, 
the reverse occurred among promotion focused participants; they experienced more 
satisfaction, yet the same amount of overload, after selecting among many ice cream 
flavors (Msatisfaction = 8.22; Moverload = 3.33) than among few ice cream flavors 
(Msatisfaction = 7.41; Moverload = 3.32), t(46) = 4.07, p < .001 for satisfaction; t < .04 for 
overload. Thus, the results of Study 3b support the link between regulatory focus and 
choice overload—prevention focus is related to experiencing choice overload, whereas  
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promotion focus is related to experiencing a reversal of choice overload. These 
findings provide evidence for the relation between self-other decision making and 
choice overload, and in particular, the mediating role of regulatory focus. To extend 
on this finding, Studies 4 and 5 were carried out to investigate potential variables that 
moderate this relationship. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
STUDY 4 
 
In this study, social distance between self and other was manipulated. As the 
social distance between the self and others changes, so too does the level of regulatory 
focus. That is, a promotion focus is related to high social distance, whereas a 
prevention focus is related to low social distance (Mogilner et al., 2008; Pennington & 
Roese, 2003). In order to manipulate social distance, participants were led to include 
others into their concept of the self. In particular, participants were primed with either 
an interdependent self-construal (low social distance) or an independent self-construal 
(high social distance) by circling pronouns in a supplied text (e.g., Gardner et al., 
1999). I expected that among participants with low social distance between self and 
other, decisions for others would be prevention focused (see also Lee et al., 2000); 
hence choice overload would be observed among both personal and proxy decision 
makers. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Sixty-nine undergraduates agreed to participate in 
exchange for extra credit. Participants were instructed to read a paragraph detailing a 
child’s rendition of a family trip to Costa Rica, and simultaneously circle pronouns 
contained within the story. In half of the stories, pronouns were independent (e.g., I, 
me, my), in the other half, pronouns were interdependent (e.g., we, us, our). Research 
has shown that circling interdependent pronouns elicits inclusion of others into the 
concept of the self (low social distance between self and other), and likewise, circling 
independent pronouns prevents inclusion of others into the concept of the self (high  
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social distance between self and other; Gardner et al., 1999; Kuhnen & Oyserman, 
2002).  
After circling pronouns, participants were given materials with paint swatches 
and asked to select one. Both the number of paint swatches differed (8 versus 35) and 
for whom participants were deciding (self versus other), such that, as in Study 1, 
participants selected among either many or few options, for either themselves or 
somebody else. 
Measures. Participants completed three items measuring satisfaction (α = .71): 
“How satisfied are you with the paint color you picked?”, “How much do you regret 
choosing the color you selected?”, and “How satisfied do you think you would be if 
you actually painted your room the color you selected?”. Each item was rated on a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely), and the second item was reverse scored. 
Following these questions, participants responded to questions designed to 
measure regulatory focus created by van Stekelenburg (2006). From 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much), participants responded with their level of agreement to 14 proverbs—half 
of which are promotion focused (e.g., “Where there’s a will, there’s a way”; α = .79) 
and half of which are prevention focused (e.g., “Act normal, that’s crazy enough”; α = 
.65). High agreement among promotion focused proverbs indicates one is in a 
promotion focus, whereas high agreement among prevention focused proverbs 
indicates one is in a prevention focus. Finally, all participants completed a check on 
their social distance by writing twenty statements about themselves. In the same 
manner as Cousins (1989), participants completed the sentence, “I am…” twenty 
different times, and the number of interdependent statements (e.g., “I am a sister”) 
plus independent statements (e.g., “I am extroverted”) was counted. 
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Results and Discussion 
  Results indicate that the manipulation of social distance was successful. Two 
coders blind to the experimental conditions and hypotheses coded each statement 
according to Cousins’ (1989) recommendations. The coders demonstrated significant 
agreement in their ratings of the statements (r = .92, p < .01), thus their assessments 
were averaged together to form one score for social distance. In particular, participants 
primed with low social distance between self and other generated proportionally more 
statements related to interdependence (M = .20) than participants primed with high 
social distance between self and other (M = .12), t(66) = 2.79, p < .01.  
Satisfaction. A 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice 
array: few versus many) X 2 (social distance: low versus high) ANOVA on 
satisfaction yielded a marginal three-way interaction, F(1, 60) = 2.75, p = .10. To 
analyze the interaction, separate analyses were performed for low and high social 
distance participants. A 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice 
array: few versus many) ANOVA among high social distance participants revealed a 
significant interaction, F(1, 36) = 6.91, p < .05, indicating high social distance 
participants who chose for themselves reported more satisfaction after choosing 
among few options (M = 6.73) compared to many (M = 5.92), t(21) = 2.03, p = .05. 
Yet, among participants who chose for others, the reverse was observed; high social 
distance participants reported more satisfaction after choosing among many options 
(M = 6.80) compared to few (M = 5.95), t(15) = 1.98, p < .05. Thus, among high 
social distance participants, the predicted pattern of the choice overload effect and 
reverse choice overload effect was observed.  
I predicted that because low social distance individuals incorporate others into 
their concept of the self (Triandis, 2001), they would evidence a prevention focus (Lee 
et al., 2000) and choose for others as they would choose for themselves. If so, then we  
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would expect low social distance individuals to experience choice overload in choices 
for both others and themselves. In other words, instead of an interaction, we would 
expect a main effect of choice array. A 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) 
X 2 (choice array: few versus many) ANOVA among low social distance participants 
revealed a significant main effect of choice array, F(1, 24) = 5.60, p < .05. The 
interaction was not significant, F < 1. Regardless of whether a decision was for the 
self or somebody else, low social distance participants experienced more satisfaction 
after choosing among few choices (M = 6.78) compared to many (M = 6.00). 
Regulatory Focus. I predicted that personal decision makers are in a 
prevention focus, and that proxy decision makers are in a promotion focus. To test the 
first prediction, a 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice array: 
few versus many) X 2 (social distance: low versus high) ANOVA on prevention was 
conducted and revealed a main effect of social distance, F(1, 60) = 7.29, p < .01, as 
we would expect given past research showing that low social distance (i.e., 
interdependent) individuals heed prevention related information more than promotion 
related information (Lee et al., 2000). Indeed, low social distance participants 
endorsed prevention focused proverbs more (M = 4.58) than high social distance 
participants (M = 3.88). Of particular interest here is the main effect of decision maker 
role, F(1, 60) = 5.47, p < .05. Personal decision makers endorsed prevention related 
proverbs more (M = 4.92) than proxy decision makers (M = 3.96). Although the 
interaction between decision maker role and social distance was not significant F < 
2.5, a simple effects test revealed that among personal decision makers, greater 
endorsement of prevention related proverbs was observed among low social distance 
participants (M = 5.01) than among high social distance participants (M = 3.98), t(36) 
= 3.45, p < .001.  
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To test the second prediction—that proxy decision makers are in a promotion 
focus—a 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice array: few versus 
many) X 2 (social distance: low versus high) ANOVA on promotion was conducted 
and revealed a main effect of decision maker role, F(1, 60) = 4.65, p < .05. As 
predicted, proxy decision makers endorsed promotion related proverbs more (M = 
5.47) than personal decision makers (M = 4.27). 
  This study extends the previous studies in several ways. First, evidence for the 
choice overload effect was found, but so was additional evidence for a reverse choice 
overload effect. Personal decision makers were less satisfied after choosing among 
many options compared to few, however, proxy decision makers were more satisfied 
after choosing among many options compared to few. In addition, the effect of social 
distance was found to moderate whether people experience choice overload. Primed 
with low social distance, participants felt overloaded by extensive options in both 
decisions for themselves and others—presumably because these participants felt 
psychologically close to others and included others into their concept of the self. 
Consequently, low social distance participants were in a prevention focus and made 
decisions for others as they would make decisions for themselves. In contrast, 
participants primed with high social distance between self and other only experienced 
choice overload in decisions for themselves, and likewise, experienced reverse choice 
overload in decisions for others. In light of these findings, personal decision makers 
were found to be in a prevention focus, whereas proxy decision makers were found to 
be in a promotion focus.  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
STUDY 5 
 
Study 5 continues this research by investigating the effect of accountability on 
self-other decision making and choice overload. Tetlock and colleagues (1983; 1985; 
Tetlock, Lerner, Boettger, 1996) suggested that when individuals are held accountable 
they simultaneously behave vigilantly; and vigilance is a sign of a prevention focus 
(Crowe & Higgins, 1997). Thus when decision makers are held accountable and have 
to consequently justify their decisions to others, attention to negative outcomes may 
take precedence over attention to positive outcomes regardless of whether decisions 
are for others. 
In testing this possibility, Study 5 comprised of students selecting courses for a 
following semester. As in the preceding studies, the array of choices and decision 
maker role varied, such that students selected among either a small or large array of 
courses for either themselves or somebody else. In addition, accountability was 
manipulated by informing half of the students that they would have to justify their 
choices to the professor of their class; the other half of students were instructed to 
justify their choices, but to no one in particular. Afterward, all participants completed 
the same check on regulatory focus used in Study 4, and answered questions dealing 
with the subsequent satisfaction with their class choices. 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. One hundred and eighty-one undergraduates 
agreed to participate in exchange for extra credit. Participants were instructed that they 
would be taking part in a study on selecting courses for the following semester. In 
particular, courses were drawn from an array of business-related offerings from  
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participants’ university course roster. Before participants selected courses, they were 
presented with a disclaimer that elicited one of two levels of accountability. For half of 
the participants, the disclaimer revealed that participants would be instructed to later 
justify their choices and that their professor (all participants were drawn from the same 
class) would read each participant’s justifications. For the other half of participants, 
the disclaimer was the same, barring the part of participants’ professor reading each 
participant’s justifications. Thus, in both conditions participants justified their choices, 
but in only one condition did participants think their professor would read their 
justifications. After reading the disclaimer, participants made their course selections. 
As in the previous studies, participants selected for either themselves or somebody 
else; moreover, participants selected among either many (60) or few (16) courses. In a 
departure from the previous studies, participants selected two options. After making 
their selections, participants justified their choices and then responded to the same 
satisfaction questions (α = .73) and regulatory focus measures (α = .79 for promotion 
focus; α = .70 for prevention focus) used in Study 4, as well as a manipulation check 
on accountability (“How concerned are you that your choices will be evaluated by 
others?”). Participants responded from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely). 
Results 
Results indicate that the manipulation of accountability was successful. Among 
participants who were instructed that the professor would read their justifications, 
concern that their choices would be evaluated by others was greater (M = 4.43) than 
among participants who were not instructed that the professor would read their 
justifications (M = 2.29), t(174) = 6.28, p < .001. 
Satisfaction. A 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice 
array: few versus many) X 2 (condition: accountable versus non-accountable) 
ANOVA on satisfaction yielded a significant main effect of choice array, F(1, 166) =  
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7.30, p < .01, indicating that participants who chose among few options experienced 
more satisfaction (M = 7.08) than participants who chose among many options (M = 
6.58). However, this effect was qualified by two interactions. The first interaction 
demonstrated accountability moderates the effect of choice array on satisfaction, F(1, 
166) = 5.13, p < .05, such that among accountable participants, satisfaction was lower 
after choosing among many (M = 6.34) compared to few options (M = 7.27), t(88) = 
3.63, p < .001; among non-accountable participants, however, no difference was 
observed, t < 1. The second interaction, and the one of particular interest here, is the 
significant three-way interaction, F(1, 166) = 4.65, p < .05. To analyze it, separate 
analyses were performed for accountable and non-accountable participants. A 2 
(decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice array: few versus many) 
ANOVA among non-accountable participants revealed a significant interaction, F(1, 
80) = 6.89, p < .05, indicating that non-accountable participants who chose for 
themselves reported more satisfaction after choosing among few options (M = 7.14) 
compared to many (M = 6.35), t(79) = 2.91, p < .01. Yet, among participants who 
chose for others, the reverse was observed; non-accountable participants reported 
more satisfaction after choosing among many options (M = 7.23) compared to few (M 
= 6.61), t(82) = 2.44, p < .05. Thus, among non-accountable participants, the 
predicted pattern of the choice overload effect was observed, yet in choices for others, 
participants experienced a reverse choice overload effect. 
I predicted that because accountable participants behave with a sense of 
prevention focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997), they would choose for others as they 
would choose for themselves. If so, then we would expect accountable participants to 
experience choice overload in choices for both others and themselves. In other words, 
instead of an interaction, we would expect a main effect of choice array. A 2 (decision 
maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice array: few versus many) ANOVA  
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among accountable participants revealed a significant main effect of choice array, F(1, 
86) = 12.67, p < .01. Moreover, the interaction was not significant, F < 1. Thus, it 
would appear that for accountable participants, choices for the self resembled choices 
for others. Regardless of whether a decision was for the self or somebody else, 
participants experienced more satisfaction after choosing among few choices (M = 
7.29) compared to many (M = 6.36). 
Regulatory Focus. I predicted that proxy decision makers are in a promotion 
focus, and that personal decision makers are in a prevention focus. To test this 
hypothesis, a 2 (decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice array: few 
versus many) X 2 (condition: accountable versus non-accountable) ANOVA on 
promotion was conducted and revealed a main effect of decision maker role, F(1, 166) 
= 4.42, p < .05. As predicted, proxy decision makers endorsed promotion related 
proverbs more (M = 5.88) than personal decision makers (M = 4.60). 
  To test whether personal decision makers are in a prevention focus, a 2 
(decision maker role: personal versus proxy) X 2 (choice array: few versus many) X 2 
(condition: accountable versus non-accountable) ANOVA on prevention was 
conducted. There was a main effect of decision maker role, F(1 166) = 7.60, p < .01, 
as well as a main effect of accountability condition, F(1, 166) = 4.05, p < .05. 
Specifically, personal decision makers endorsed prevention related proverbs more (M 
= 5.39) than proxy decision makers(M = 3.97); moreover, consistent with research 
linking accountability and prevention focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997), accountable 
participants endorsed prevention related proverbs more (M = 5.30) than non-
accountable participants (M = 4.06). 
The findings from this study provide converging evidence that the effects of 
choice overload are reversed among proxy decision makers, and suggest that these 
effects are moderated by felt accountability. Among personal decision makers, greater  
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satisfaction was experienced in choices with few options compared to choices with 
many options—in other words, the choice overload effect was observed. However, the 
reverse was observed among proxy decision makers. In this case, greater satisfaction 
was experienced in choices with many options compared to choices with few options. 
That said, among people who were accountable for their choices, the reverse choice 
overload effect was absent. Instead, in both choices for the self and others, choice 
overload was present. Why? It was suggested that self-other decision making varies 
with regulatory focus. As predicted, among personal decision makers, a prevention 
focus was evidenced, and among proxy decision makers, a promotion focus was 
evidenced. However, among proxy decisions who were induced to feel accountability, 
a prevention focus was evidenced and their choices were thus similar to the choices 
that people make for themselves.  
  As a secondary contribution, Study 5 continues the research on choice 
overload by examining a context in which people make more than one decision. 
Research on choice overload typically comprises instructions to select and make one 
single decision. But decisions in real life may not be as simple. For example, in 
thinking about what to make for dinner, an individual may make several decisions, 
such as deciding which ingredients to use and which entrée to make, that altogether 
culminate into one ultimate decision. As in the current study, students selected more 
than one course that would form their overall course load. In this vein, the current 
study demonstrates that the choice overload effect—as well as the reverse choice 
overload effect—operates in contexts in which people make multiple decisions. 
Evidently, the opportunity to secure more alternatives does not eliminate the choice 
overload effect.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
STUDY 6 
 
In spite of the clear findings presented so far, the effect of making a decision 
for someone else on reversing the choice overload effect seems remarkable enough to 
beg additional verification. In this vein, a mini meta-analysis was carried out. The 
present studies provide good conditions for statistical replication. For example, the 
participant populations included both college students and non-college students. In 
addition, the data for each study were collected across three years at different points in 
time. What is more, the array of choices ranged from hypothetical to real, and included 
consumer products such as ice cream, wine, and paint swatches, in addition to 
educational choices such as classes. Further, these choices ranged in their ease with 
which they can be categorized, from relatively easy (e.g., wines can be categorized by 
country) to relatively difficult (e.g., ice cream can be categorized by, perhaps, caloric 
content). Finally, the primary dependent variable, satisfaction, comprised of different 
items across studies. To be sure, each study taken alone provides a good view of the 
total pattern of results, however, a test of how well the hypothesis fares writ large 
requires looking across studies. 
In this regard, I present the results of a mini meta-analysis of Studies 1, 2, 4, 
and 5 (Studies 3a and 3b are excluded on account of them being composed of two 
parts; that is, the effect of self-other decision making on choice overload is not directly 
tested). The results from each study are displayed in Table 1. I first obtained the z 
value associated with the probability of the null hypothesis, that is, the traditional p 
value. The combined probability was obtained using the method suggested by 
Rosenthal (1984) and is simply the sum of the zs divided by the square root of the  
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number of studies entered into the computation. Note that in Study 4, I report the 
results for high and low social distance separately; likewise, in Study 5, I do the same 
for accountable and non-accountable participants. Thus, these were considered 
separate samples for purposes of the meta-analysis. 
TABLE 1                
Meta-Analysis 
  
Choice 
Overload     Reverse 
Choice Overload 
Study  z  p     z  p 
Study 1  2.17  0.0300     2.12  0.0340 
Study 2  2.42  0.0155     2.11  0.0349 
Study 4                
     High social distance participants  1.92  0.0549     1.84  0.0658 
     Low social distance participants  2.22  0.0264     NA  NA 
Study 5                
     Non-accountable participants  2.83  0.0047     2.39  0.0168 
     Accountable participants  3.43  0.0006     NA  NA 
Combined statistics  6.12  0.0000     4.12  0.0000 
                 
  I hypothesized that choice overload reverses among people who make 
decisions for others, and preserves among people who make decisions for themselves. 
As Table 1 shows, we can be quite certain that choice overload occurs among people 
who make their own decisions (p < .001). Moreover, there is clear evidence that the 
reverse occurs among people who make decisions for others (p < .001). Overall, then, 
there appears to be strong, reliable support for the relation between self-other decision 
making and choice overload. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The current series of experiments address whether a reverse choice overload 
effect is observed in decisions for others, and whether regulatory focus mediates this 
relationship. In five of the experiments, plus a mini meta-analysis, both a choice 
overload and reverse choice overload effect was evidenced. Contrary to the findings of 
Iyengar and Lepper (2000), the present research demonstrates a clear example of when 
more choice satisfies in comparison to less choice. As long as participants chose for 
others, decisions comprising more paint swatches (Study 1 and 4), more wine (Study 
2), more flavors of ice cream (Study 3), and more school courses (Study 5) were more 
satisfying and less regrettable than decisions comprising fewer of these choices. 
Owing to the fact that a decision for somebody else activates a promotion focus and 
hence a motivation to reduce errors of omission, individuals experienced greater 
satisfaction after choosing among many options. Likewise, because a decision for the 
self activates a prevention focus and hence a motivation to reduce errors of 
commission, individuals experienced less satisfaction after choosing among many 
options.  
Along these lines, in making decisions for others, participants who were 
primed with low social distance (Study 4) or led to believe that they were accountable 
for their choices (Study 5) did not show the reverse choice overload effect. Instead, 
under conditions of low social distance and accountability, a prevention focus was 
activated, resulting in individuals’ decisions for others to resemble individuals’ 
decisions for themselves. These findings are consistent with other research. Lee et al. 
(2000) found that low social distance was related to a prevention focus; as did Crowe  
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and Higgins (1997) with respect to accountability. Moreover, in a medical study, 
Zikmund-Fisher et al. (2006) found that proxy decision makers committed fewer 
errors of omission (e.g., not giving a vaccine) compared to personal decision makers. 
Together, this evidence provides a strong case that among proxy decision makers, a 
motivation to reduce errors of omission is present, likewise, among personal decision 
makers, a motivation to reduce errors of commission is present.  
The theoretical implications of the present work reach beyond the context of 
choice overload. Fundamentally, this research sheds light on the differences between 
making a decision for the self and making a decision on behalf of somebody else. A 
handful of earlier studies have investigated choice overload, regulatory focus, and self-
other decision making, and the current work makes contributions to these lines of 
research in three different ways. First, although choice overload is explained by 
demotivation (Iyengar & Lepper, 2000), this explanation may be limited to decisions 
that are for the self. Indeed, the current work demonstrates that choice overload is 
context dependent, such that in cases like making decisions for others, choosing 
among many alternatives is not in itself demotivating, and by the same token, not 
unsatisfying. In particular, other mechanisms may be used to explain choice overload, 
as in the present case with regulatory focus. This perspective is not meant to invalidate 
or replace explanations based on demotivation. Instead, it is meant to complement 
these accounts by showing choice overload can be produced according to individuals’ 
regulatory focus. 
Second, the current work reconciles mixed findings surrounding research on 
self-other decision making. Research to date has examined whether proxy decision 
makers make more or less risky decisions compared to personal decision makers (e.g., 
Beisswanger et al., 2003; Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007; Stone et al., 2002; Wray 
& Stone, 2005). Although this research is inconclusive insofar as decisions for others  
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have been found to be both more risky and less risky than decisions made for the self, 
an appeal to regulatory focus informs that it might not be a case of whether decisions 
for others compared to decisions for the self differ according to level of risk, but 
rather, according to a selective focus on positive and negative information. For 
example, when making a decision for the self, and a prevention focus is activated, a 
cautious decision (e.g., declining a blind date) might result when an individual 
anticipates the presence of a negative outcome (e.g., going on a blind date with a 
boring partner) whereas a risky decision (e.g., continuing to gamble after incurring a 
loss) might result when an individual anticipates the absence of a negative outcome 
(e.g., mollifying a loss). Thus, applying regulatory focus to self-other decision making 
is of particular importance because it reconciles past research into a unifying theory.  
Third, an investigation of self-other decision making is interesting in its own 
right. There have been few attempts to study how decision making is different when a 
decision is for the self compared to when it is for somebody else, thus the research 
offers potential new findings in literatures of behavioral decision making, social 
psychology, marketing, and organizational behavior. Indeed, the results presented here 
lead to speculations about other studies that in some way or another deal with self-
other decision making. The following discussion provides some examples. 
Self-Other Perception. Self-perception is based on individuals’ internal states, 
whereas other-perception is based on individuals’ overt behaviors (Prentice, 1990). 
Moreover, Symons and Johnson (1997) concluded in a meta-analysis that self-
perception is more elaborate than other-perception because individuals rely on their 
memories to form self-perceptions. To the degree that individuals rely on their 
memories, decisions will be different (Weber & Johnson, 2006). Considering this, we 
might suspect that decisions for the self and others vary according to whether they are, 
in the parlance of Lynch and Srull (1982), memory-based or stimulus-based. In the  
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former, preferences are retrieved from memory (e.g., grocery shopping without a list); 
in the latter, preferences are externally specified (e.g., grocery shopping with a list). 
This difference is important because individuals form different preferences and hence 
make different decisions under conditions of memory-based and stimulus-based 
choices (Rottenstreich, Sood, & Brenner, 2007). Of relevance is that individuals 
cannot access others’ memories (or any other internal states); accordingly, decisions 
for others may be based on others’ observable and presented behaviors—which could 
be thought of as external stimuli. In making decisions for others then, individuals 
might surmise others’ preferences by forming inferences of their overt behaviors—as 
work on the fundamental attribution error suggests (for a review, see Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995). In this manner, we can consider decisions for others as constrained by 
the stimuli presented to us (i.e., limited to observable behaviors) and decisions for the 
self as enriched by internal states such as prior knowledge stored in memory and 
mood, that only the self can access. Indeed, people tend to think of others’ behaviors 
as less labile compared to their own behaviors (Baxter & Goldberg, 1987) and think of 
themselves as having more opposing traits (e.g., serious and carefree) than others 
(Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 1988). Work by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provides 
a similar explanation, in that predictions for others tend to be based on an “external 
approach”, that is to say, how others have behaved in the past (i.e., base rates) whereas 
predictions for the self tend to be based on an “internal approach” that favors personal 
and self-possessed information (e.g., Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 1994; Epley & 
Dunning, 2000). 
Cognitive Dissonance. In the regret literature, research is unequivocal 
concerning the degree of regret people experience in actions they have taken relative 
to actions they have not (i.e., inactions). Stemming from a classic scenario by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1982) describing two investors, one who sells shares and  
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discovers later he would have been better off by $1200 if he had not sold (action 
condition), and another who considers against selling shares and discovers later he 
would have been better off by $1200 if he had sold (inaction condition), research has 
shown that people confer greater regret to the former individual—the one who takes 
action by selling shares—than to the latter individual—the one who does nothing 
(Baron & Ritov, 1994); of course, this is despite both investors are equally worse off. 
With respect to cognitive dissonance, Gilovich, Medvec, and Chen (1995) showed in 
the Monty Hall problem that action (e.g., deciding to switch prizes) elicits greater 
cognitive dissonance than inaction (e.g., deciding not to switch prizes). Applied to the 
present case, Kray and Gonzalez (1999) found more action in decisions for the self 
than among decisions for others; specifically, students were more likely to switch 
majors for themselves than they were willing to advise for others. Being that action, 
such as switching majors, evidences more in decisions for the self, and elicits greater 
cognitive dissonance, it is plausible that personal decision makers experience more 
cognitive dissonance than proxy decision makers. In fact, one study has found that 
cognitive dissonance is greater among personal decision makers. Hoshino-Browne et 
al. (2005) reported that among European Canadians, more dissonance reduction was 
observed in choices for the self than in choices for others. However, the authors also 
report an interaction, such that among Japanese Canadians, more dissonance reduction 
was observed in choices for others than in choices for the self. 
Systematic and Heuristic Processing. Levin, Schnittjer, and Thee (1988) 
reported that in scenarios about the self, framing effects disappear, whereas in 
scenarios about others, framing effects are present—presumably because in scenarios 
that involve the self, situations are personally involving and cause individuals to 
consider all sides of an issue. In line with thinking of decisions for the self as 
incorporating more personal involvement, is the idea that decisions for the self are  
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characterized by systematic thinking whereas decisions for others are characterized by 
heuristic thinking. Chaiken (1980) showed that in decisions that are personally 
involving, individuals process arguments systematically; what is more, work by Petty, 
Cacioppo, and Goldman (1981) evidenced the complementary finding, that low 
personal involvement is positively related to attention to peripheral cues, in other 
words, heuristic thinking. Considering individuals have more knowledge of 
themselves than they have of others (Kruger, Windschitl, Burrus, Fessel, & Chambers, 
2008), and that individuals with relatively low stores of knowledge revert to heuristic 
thinking (Wood, Rhodes, & Biek, 1995), it is plausible that decisions for others are 
made heuristically whereas decisions for the self are made systematically. 
Empathy. In looking at levels of empathy among proxy decision makers, a 
lack of empathy may lead people to make decisions that are inappropriate or worse, 
suboptimal. If decision makers lack empathy, they might make decisions for others 
based on what they themselves would decide, or alternatively, succumb to heuristics 
like the fundamental attribution error and make decisions for others based on others’ 
overt behaviors, instead of attempting to perceive others’ internal states and base 
decisions on others’ affect and cognition. Even if decision makers demonstrate 
empathy, different decisions could result considering decision makers can adopt 
different styles of empathy. For example, Batson, Early, and Salvarani (1997) report 
on two different ways to empathize with someone, one by imagining how the other 
feels, and another by imagining how one would feel if they were the other. Although 
both forms of empathy are similar, the latter form elicits personal distress, which 
activates a self-oriented motivation aimed at eliminating distress (Batson, Fultz, & 
Schoenrade, 1987). Decisions are different when they are made under stress compared 
to when they are not (e.g., Janis, 1982). In like manner, decisions are different 
according to whether they are made in “hot” or “cold” states (Loewenstein, 1999), in  
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other words, with or without emotions (e.g., anger), drives (e.g., hunger), or 
motivations (e.g., pain). Research has shown that people are unable to accurately 
predict what they will want in the future because their affective states will potentially 
be different in the future (Loewenstein & Schkade, 1997), but more to the point, 
people are also unable to predict what others will want in the future—this is called an 
empathy gap. As an example, Loewenstein (2005) asserted that a patient may be in a 
hot state after receiving bad news despite a doctor’s pain-free cold state, a difference 
that could cause the doctor to underappreciate the patient’s pain and ultimately cause 
the doctor to undermedicate the patient. 
Creativity. Although much research has investigated creative problem solving, 
the research has focused on generating ideas or solutions that are for the self—and has 
not yet explored how generating ideas or solutions for others influences people’s 
creativity. Based on research on construal level theory, it is possible that people are 
more creative on others’ behalves, and consequently generate more creative ideas and 
solve more insight problems than people who carry out these creative activities for 
themselves. Indeed, in making decisions for others, the level of construal is higher 
than in making decisions for the self (Liberman et al., 2007). Given that individuals’ 
cognition becomes more creative when they are induced into high-level mental 
representations (Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Jia, Hirt, & Karpen, 2009), it is 
plausible that individuals who solve creative problems on behalf of others are more 
creative than individuals who solve creative problems for themselves. 
Power. Also potentially worthwhile is considering the role of power among 
personal and proxy decision makers. In particular, do people experience feelings of 
power when they make decisions for other people? This is an interesting question 
because people have a tendency to eschew empathy when they feel powerful 
(Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006)—a potential problem among proxy  
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decision makers, being that they may fail to adequately empathize with those for 
whom they are making decisions. What is more, power also causes people to make 
riskier and more aggressive decisions, as well selective focusing and inattention to 
peripheral cues (Anderson & Galinsky, 2006; Fast & Chen, 2009; Guinote, 2007). If 
proxy decision makers do feel as though they have power, we might suspect that their 
decisions for others resemble, in a non-trivial, the effects of power on decisions. 
Future research will therefore benefit from extending investigations of power into a 
self-other decision making context.  
Limitations 
Although the research is ripe for investigating self-other decision making, there 
are limitations to keep in mind. For example, personal decision makers get to 
experience the outcomes of their choices, however, proxy decision makers may rarely 
get to experience the outcomes. This difference is important because commensurate 
with getting to experience an outcome is anticipating the nature of the outcome; put 
differently, if an individual chooses for herself, she will potentially consider the extent 
she anticipates regretting her choice before ultimately choosing (Zeelenberg, 1999). 
But if an individual is choosing for somebody else, she may not anticipate regret and 
therefore preclude it from influencing her decision. That said, participants in Studies 1, 
3, 4, and 5 did not actually experience their choices, suggesting self-other differences 
in decision making remain even after controlling for the influence of anticipating 
outcomes. Nevertheless, future research should directly examine the effect of 
experiencing an outcome in self-other decision making. 
A second limitation of the current research is that it is impossible to know for 
whom individuals were choosing. On research in social judgment, Epley and Dunning 
(2000) suggested that individuals make different predictions for strangers or “averages 
persons” than they do for family members or friends (see also Hsee & Weber, 1997).  
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The same could be said with making decisions, such that decisions may vary 
according to whether the other is a close or distant other. This notion dovetails with 
Study 4, being that the social distance between the self and other was directly 
manipulated, and different effects on choice overload were observed. Moreover, 
participants in Study 2 who chose among wines in a store presumably knew for whom 
they were choosing, yet still experienced reverse choice overload. Likewise, the same 
results were found in Study 3a, in which participants were instructed to choose for 
friends. Thus, we might expect differences in self-other decision making according to 
whom people are choosing (e.g., mother, friend, employee). Future research should 
directly investigate specific degrees of social distance such as choosing for 
subordinates or superordinates, among possible other cases such as choosing on behalf 
of a group. 
  Another limitation of the current research is the focus on post-choice 
satisfaction. Although investigating satisfaction is crucial to measuring choice 
overload, the current research ignores whether decisions for the self and others are 
different in areas beyond post-choice satisfaction and regulatory focus. I found that 
choices for others and choices for the self are psychologically different, but are they 
logically different? Considering a different regulatory focus is elicited and—
depending on the array of choices—different post-choice satisfaction is experienced, 
we can suspect that the objective nature of decisions is also different between personal 
and proxy decisions. Still, future research is necessary to confirm this assertion and 
examine in what particular ways decisions for the self are different from decisions for 
others. 
Implications 
Understanding the differences in self-other decision making is not only 
valuable for researchers in organizational behavior, social psychology and decision  
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making, but should also prove of considerable interest to managers, negotiators, 
product designers, marketers, and advertisers, among many others. In the motivation 
literature for example, managers can be divided into two groups based on how they 
perceive their employees—as lazy and unmotivated, or as empowered and responsible 
(McGregor, 1960). It is easy to imagine managers in one group making different 
decisions for subordinates compared to managers in the other group. In fact, Simon 
(1979) writes that organizations are shaped by the decisions that managers make, and 
to the extent that decisions for others reflect a tendency that employees are empowered 
and responsible, we can expect organizations to be decentralized and have high levels 
of participative management and job enlargement; whereas if decisions for others 
reflect a tendency that employees are lazy and unmotivated, we can expect 
organizations to be centralized and have low levels of autonomy. Thus, the way in 
which people make decisions for others may influence outcomes at the organizational 
level. 
Another implication of the current work deals with personality, specifically 
whether proxy decision makers show empathy. Kray and Gonzalez (1999) suggested 
that there may be an individual difference in ‘placing oneself in another’s shoes’; if so, 
organizations could assess which employees are best suited to make decisions for 
others, and likewise, which employees are best suited to make decisions for 
themselves. Among people who make decisions for others, organizations should desire 
empathetic employees, for example people who score high on perspective taking and 
empathic concern. High scores on these scales indicate healthy social functioning, 
such as feeling sympathetic and warm toward others, plus the ability to anticipate 
others’ behaviors and reactions (Davis, 1983). Considering decisions for others 
necessitate conferring an outcome onto others, it is morally important that decision 
makers make good decisions, but it is also important for people whom decisions are  
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made (i.e., decision takers) to be satisfied with others’ decisions, being that an 
unsatisfying decision could undermine its quality despite how good it is. In this vein, 
we might want to consider not just decision makers’ personalities but also decision 
takers’ reactions, since ultimately they are the ones who bear the personal 
consequences of decisions (e.g., See, 2009). In the same way leadership research looks 
at both leaders and followers (i.e., followership) decision making research could look 
at situations and dispositions that enable people to make decisions for others and, 
dutifully take decisions from others. 
A third implication of the present findings is in the domain of empathy gaps. 
Loewenstein (2005) recommended that people wait before making decisions with 
irrevocable consequences. The same could be said for people who make decisions for 
others. By taking extra time to deliberate, decision makers may empathize with their 
targets, but they may also converge on their targets’ hot and cold states as well, 
minimizing the gap between their states and their targets’ states. Still, this may be 
easier said than done, insofar as discerning others’ states is complex; one has to intuit 
the other’s state when the other finds out about the decision, but also important, the 
other’s state when the decision is ultimately executed, all while accounting for one’s 
own state. In spite of this, understanding others have different states will hopefully 
help in closing the gaps and produce good decisions for others. 
Conclusion 
In short, among personal decision makers, a prevention focus is activated and 
people are more satisfied with their decisions after choosing among few options 
compared to many options; in other words, individuals experience the choice overload 
effect. A different picture emerges among proxy decision makers. In this case, a 
promotion focus is activated and people are more satisfied with their decisions after  
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choosing among many options compared to few options; that is to say, individuals 
experience the reverse choice overload effect. 
Coda 
Given the ubiquity of decisions that are made on behalf of others, it is 
surprising how little research has been conducted on self-other decision making in 
psychology, marketing, and the management literature writ large. Relatively little is 
known about how people make decisions for other people, yet much is known about 
decision making in general. This was a natural place to begin, for without some basic 
understanding of decision making, one stands little chance of understanding the 
complex case of how people make decisions for other people. Work in this area can 
cast research in decision making in a whole new light. It could mean some of the 
decision heuristics and biases we take for granted are nonexistent or even reversed 
when a decision is made on behalf of another—such as in the present case for the 
choice overload effect. In the Bible, Luke teaches, “Do to others as you would have 
them do to you” (6:31). In retrospect, this lesson might be especially difficult to heed 
considering decisions we make for others are different from decisions we make for 
ourselves.  
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